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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of investor protection on equilibrium stock prices, returns and portfolio allocation
decisions. In our theoretical model, if investor protection is weak, wealthy investors have an incentive
to become controlling shareholders. In equilibrium, the stock price reects the demand from both
controlling shareholders and portfolio investors. As a consequence, due to the high demand from
controlling shareholders, the price of weak corporate governance stocks is not low enough to fully
discount the extraction of private benets. This generates the following empirical implications. First,
stocks should have lower expected returns when investor protection is weak. Second, domestic and
foreign investors participation in the stock market should be lower in countries with weak investor
protection. Third, portfolio investors from countries with weak investor protection should hold relatively
more foreign equity. Fourth, countries with weak investor protection should receive relatively more
foreign direct investment. We show that these implications are consistent with existing empirical studies
and we provide original evidence that domestic portfolio investors are less likely to participate in the
domestic stock market and hold more foreign equity, when investor protection is weak.
JEL codes: G11; G32; G38; F21; F36.
Keywords: Investor Protection; Corporate Governance; Private Benets of Control; Stock Returns;
Portfolio Choice; Home Equity Bias.
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I Introduction
Investor protection is well known to a¤ect corporate nancial policies, rm valuations, and ownership
concentration. Only recently academics have started to investigate how investor protection and corpo-
rate governance are related to investorsportfolio holdings. There is now growing evidence that portfolio
investors avoid investing in companies or countries that display weak corporate governance. For ex-
ample, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) show that both foreign and domestic portfolio investors are less
likely to invest in Swedish companies with weak corporate governance. Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2008)
provide evidence that U.S. investors avoid investing in foreign companies when investor protection is
deemed to be a problem. In addition, Kho, Stulz, and Warnock (2006) show that U.S. investors increase
their holdings of shares in Korean rms, when those rms improve their corporate governance. There is
also anecdotal evidence indicating that corporate governance is important in portfolio allocation deci-
sions. In its survey, McKinsey&Company (2002) quotes the CFO from a major European private bank
saying that "I simply would not buy a company with poor corporate governance".
At rst sight, this phenomenon is puzzling. If it is common knowledge that portfolio investors
may su¤er from poor investor protection, then the possibility of getting expropriated should be fully
discounted in the stock price. Portfolio investors should thus have no reason to avoid investing in poorly
governed rms or countries. A possible explanation is that stocks of weak corporate governance rms
are not available to outside investors. Stulz (2005) argues that in poorly governed countries, corporate
insiders nd it optimal to hold large stakes as a commitment mechanism not to expropriate outside
investors too much. As a result of concentrated ownership, the amount of stocks available to portfolio
investors is limited. Indeed, once the availability of stocks is taken into account, the tendency for U.S.
investors to avoid poorly governed countries is less pronounced, as shown by Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz
and Williamson (2003). However, taking into account insider ownership does not eliminate the home
bias in U.S. investorsportfolios.
In this paper, we build on the idea that corporate governance plays an important role in investors
portfolio allocation decisions. We show that the e¤ects of ownership concentration, resulting from weak
investor protection, can go well beyond limiting the supply of stocks available to portfolio investors. If
in equilibrium the excess demand curve for stocks is less than perfectly elastic, prices reect not only
security benets, but also the consumption of private benets of control by insiders. Our key insight
is that stock prices may not fully discount the consumption of private benets of control by insiders,
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because those investors are willing to increase their demand for stocks and drive up the market clearing
prices. In our model, investor protection a¤ects how a rms cash ows are divided between security
benets, which accrue to all shareholders pro-rata, and private benets, which only the controlling
shareholders have access to. This division in turn a¤ects the prices that di¤erent classes of investors are
willing to pay for their stocks. If some investors can gain access to both private and security benets,
then those investors are willing to pay more for stocks than investors who can only enjoy security benets.
Since the market price of stocks reects the demand from both controlling and outside shareholders, the
equilibrium price of weak corporate governance stocks is not low enough to fully discount the extraction
of private benets. Outside shareholders are still willing to hold weak corporate governance stocks for
diversication reasons, but they reduce their demand. In equilibrium, the expected return of holding
stocks for outside investors is lower than it would be in the absence of expropriation of private benets
of control.
Our model o¤ers an explanation for a growing body of empirical evidence showing that weak in-
vestor protection is negatively related to stock returns (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Core, Guay
and Rusticus, 2006; Cremers and Nair, 2005; and Yermack, 2006). This nding is puzzling from the
perspective of existing partial equilibrium models predicting that the possibility of getting expropriated
should be fully discounted in the stock price. We show that the possibility of extracting private benets
a¤ects some investorss preferences for stocks, and, consequently, asset prices. From a theoretical point
of view, our point is similar to Fama and French (2007) who show that tastes for assets as consumption
goods a¤ect asset prices. More in general, the explanation we put forward is related to the literature,
initiated by Summers (1985) and Shleifer (1986), that points out how demand and supply are impor-
tant for determining stock prices if arbitrage does not function perfectly.1 Our contribution is to show
how corporate governance and ownership concentration a¤ect aggregate demand for stocks and thus
equilibrium returns.
We also study how investor protection inuences the equity holdings of di¤erent classes of investors,
depending on the amount of wealth they have been endowed with. Using a simple two-country equilib-
rium model, we generate several empirical implications on cross-country capital ows.
First, lower security returns reduce the incentives to invest in stocks for those shareholders who are
not wealthy enough to acquire large equity stakes and to participate in the extraction of private benets
1For some papers emphasizing the importance of demand and supply e¤ects, see Bagwell (1991), Gompers and Metrick
(2001), and Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005).
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of control. In the aggregate, domestic and foreign portfolio investors hold the free-oat portfolio in
equilibrium. Hence, as suggested by Stulz (2005), weak investor protection reduces foreign portfolio
investors equity holdings by lowering the free-oat. However, portfolio investors with low initial wealth
may refrain from buying weak investor protection stocks all together, resulting in individual portfolios
that are tilted towards good corporate governance stocks even in comparison to the free-oat.
Weak investor protection thus reduces the incentives to participate in the domestic stock market for
both domestic and foreign outside investors, suggesting that home equity bias and limited participation
puzzle are related. Investors from a strong corporate governance country prefer to invest in their own
country, leading to the home equity bias. Similarly, domestic non-controlling investors are less inclined to
participate in the domestic stock market if investor protection is weak. They are interested in investing
in foreign countries that o¤er better investor protection than their home country. To put it di¤erently,
these investors are less prone to participate in the domestic market and exhibit a good country bias.
In the aggregate, however, we expect the home equity bias to hold also in weak investor protection
countries, because the domestic wealthy investors have an incentive to acquire control blocks in their
own country when less wealthy investors have stronger incentives to invest abroad. Large shareholders
home equity bias overwhelms the good country bias of domestic portfolio investors in aggregate data.
Second, while portfolio investors have a good country bias in selecting their equity investment,
foreign controlling shareholders exhibit a bad country bias, meaning that they prefer to invest in weak
investor protection countries. This last theoretical implication is consistent with some recent empirical
evidence on the foreign investments of U.S. multinationals (Kelley and Woidtke, 2006), international
M&A (Rossi and Volpin, 2004), and foreign investment in emerging markets (Desai and Moel, 2008).
The ow of foreign direct investments (which refers to foreign investments whose objective is to acquire
control in contrast to foreign portfolio investments) to countries with weak investor protection does not
run counter to the home equity bias, because the literature and the statisticson home equity bias
refer only to equity holdings of portfolio investors.
Third, if the market for corporate control is segmented across countries, in equilibrium, it is not
necessarily true that a country with worse investor protection has higher ownership concentration. The
initial distribution of wealth is as important as investor protection in determining ownership structure.
If wealth distribution is even and the markets for control are segmented, nobody may be wealthy
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enough to be able to acquire control and extract private benets.2 Hence, even if investor protection
is weak, participation in the domestic stock market and return on equity for portfolio investors may be
high. Conversely, small improvements in investor protection are not su¢ cient to spur equity market
participation if the wealth distribution is skewed. Changes in wealth distribution can thus explain why
the relation between ownership concentration and investor protection is weaker or does not hold if long
periods of time are considered (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).
Finally, we explore some of our models empirical implications. We nd that cross-country di¤er-
ences in portfolio choices are indeed related to di¤erences in investor protection. First, fewer domestic
individual investors participate in the domestic stock market in weak investor protection countries. Sec-
ond, in weak investor protection countries, domestic portfolio investorsholdings of foreign relative to
domestic equity are larger than in countries where minority shareholders are better protected.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the paper to the literature.
Section 3 and Section 4 present the model and the main results, respectively. Section 5 outlines some
extensions, while Section 6 provides existing and novel empirical evidence supporting the implications
of the model. Section 7 concludes.
II Related literature
This paper is related to three main strands of literature: the law and nance literature, the home equity
bias literature, and the literature on limited investor participation in stock markets. Firstly, this paper
is related to the large literature initiated by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997
and 1998).3 They show that the size and scope of capital markets are positively related to investor
protection. Moreover, they show that companies with controlling shareholders are very common around
the world and that ownership is more concentrated in weak investor protection countries (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999). Typically, the literature on law and nance has emphasized the
protection of minority shareholders in the corporate law. However, securities law may be at least as
important for the functioning of nancial markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2006).
2This is clearly the case if portfolio investors, such as pension funds and other institutional investors, are able to monitor
and prevent the management from extracting private benets when control is contestable. Analyzing these issues is beyond
the scope of this paper.
3For an overview, see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (2000).
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In the law and nance literature, our paper is closest to Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), who show that
companies have higher valuation and ownership is less concentrated in countries with better investor
protection. While Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) focus on the implications of investor protection on
corporate nancing and investment, we aim to analyze investorsportfolio choices.4
Secondly, this paper is also related to the large literature on the home equity bias. The home
equity bias is one of the least contested empirical facts in nance (for a survey, see Lewis, 1999). Under
standard assumptions from portfolio theory and absent legal restrictions, investors should hold the world
portfolio. Empirically, however, this is not the case. Studies document that the home bias holds for
very diverse countries ranging from the developed nancial markets of the U.S. to small markets like
the Scandinavian ones, all the way to emerging markets.5 There exist several other explanations for the
home equity bias besides the explanation provided in this paper. Legal restrictions were an important
factor when there were binding restrictions on international capital ows, but home bias has persisted
even though legal restrictions on foreign ownership have been relaxed. Also foreign investments may be
taxed more harshly than domestic investments.6 However, as argued by Ahearne, Griever and Warnock
(2004), legal restrictions and taxes are of secondary importance in explaining the home equity bias. In
international nance, the most widely cited reason for the home equity bias is asymmetric information.
Domestic investors are assumed to know more about domestic stocks than foreign investors leading to
increased investments in domestic equities (Brennan and Cao, 1997). This explanation can, however,
be challenged. Informational advantage could be in fact the opposite in some cases: it can be argued
that large foreign portfolio investors are more sophisticated, and, therefore, better informed than small
domestic investors. Consistently, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) show using Finnish data that foreign
investors have outperformed domestic investors.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on limited stock market participation (see, for in-
stance, Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; and Brav, Constantinides and Gezcy, 2002).
All papers in this literature explore low household participation in the stock market within a single
country. However, Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2001 and 2003) have showed that there are signi-
4 In a recent paper, Albuquerque and Wang (2007) study asset prices using a dynamic general equilibrium model where
large shareholders are able to extract private benets. In Albuquerque and Wang, poor investor protection leads to higher
investment, resulting in increased stock price volatility, and hence higher risk premium.
5For example, for the U.S., Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004) document that at the end of 1997, U.S. stocks
comprised 48.3% of the world market portfolio, yet U.S. investors only invested 10.1% of their stock portfolios abroad.
6Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) model barriers to international investments as taxes paid on foreign holdings.
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cant cross-country di¤erences in investor participation rates. The phenomenon has lacked a theoretical
justication, and this paper is the rst one to provide an explanation for that.
III The model
We study the e¤ects of investor protection and ownership concentration on equilibrium equity returns,
and domestic and foreign investorsportfolio allocation in a simple two-country model. We abstract from
rm investment policies and assume that in each country there is one company (risky asset or stock)
with exogenously given random cash-ows. In addition, there is a risk-free asset, which is common to
both countries. Investors are endowed with di¤erent amounts of wealth, which consists of the domestic
risky asset and the risk free asset. We analyze how given the initial distribution of wealth, investors
reallocate their portfolios between foreign and domestic stocks and the risk free asset, depending on the
exogenously given level of investor protection.
A Investment opportunities
Two symmetric countries, called Home and Foreign, di¤er in the level of investor protection and the
distribution of wealth. We denote foreign variables with an asterisk. Homes (Foreigns) risky asset
has a gross random payo¤ eX ( eX ). The expected payo¤ of the risky assets is X and their variance
is 2X . The payo¤s of the two assets are identically and independently distributed.
7 The price of the
domestic (foreign) risky asset is denoted by P (P ) and is determined endogenously in equilibrium.
Risky assets are available in xed supply, which we normalize to 1, and are initially owned by each
countrys residents.
Investors have also access to a risk-free asset, identical in both countries, whose return we normalize
to 0. We take the risk free asset to be the numeraire and assume that one unit of the risk free asset is
available in each country.
B Investors
In both countries, there are heterogeneous investors, who di¤er in the amount of initial wealth, W0.
There is a nite number of large investors (without loss of generality, 2 per country) and a contin-
7This assumption allows us to simplify the calculations, but it is not essential for the results.
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uum of small investors. Investorsinitial wealth consists of a share w0 (w0) of their countrys assets.
Total domestic wealth is 1 + P at Home and 1 + P  in Foreign. Each large investor owns a share
of the initial wealth, w0 < 12 at Home (w

0 <
1
2 in Foreign). Small investors initial share of wealth
w0 (w

0) is distributed between 0 and w0 (w

0), and satises the condition
R w0
0 w0dF (w0) = 1   2w0R w0
0 w

0dF
(w0) = 1  2w

0

, where F (F ) is a continuous cumulative density function describing the
distribution of initial wealth among small investors at Home (in Foreign). The distribution of initial
wealth among all investors at Home (in Foreign) is described by G (G). Investors can allocate their
initial wealth W0  w0 (1 + P ) (W 0  w0 (1 + P ) in Foreign) between the risk free asset, domestic
and foreign risky assets. We allow all investors to submit limit orders (i.e., demand schedules specifying
the amounts of stock they are willing to buy conditional on prices). Investors cannot borrow to invest
in the stock market, nor can they sell stocks short.8
In our model, buying a risky asset is equivalent to participating in the stock market. Following the
existing literature (see, e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002), we assume that buying a risky asset entails a
xed participation cost, denoted by c. Investors pay a separate cost for participating in the domestic
and foreign markets. The cost is assumed to be equal for both markets.9
An investor can acquire control in a company if he buys a share of the company stock larger than
 and he becomes the largest shareholder. The controlling shareholder (CS) enjoys private benets of
control in addition to security benets, which are shared equally by all investors. The benchmark results
of the model are derived assuming that the market for control is segmented, while nancial markets
are otherwise perfectly integrated. That is, foreign investors are not able to extract private benets of
control.10 In Section V, we extend the model by relaxing this assumption.
We denote Home controlling shareholders domestic and foreign shareholdings as HCS and 
F
CS (
F
CS
and HCS for Foreign controlling shareholder). The emergence of controlling shareholders is determined
endogenously. We refer to investors without control as portfolio investors (PI) and denote their domestic
and foreign shareholdings as: HPI and 
F
PI (
F
PI and 
H
PI for portfolio investors in Foreign).
11
8These assumptions are stronger than we actually need. It would su¢ ce for our purposes to impose that margin
requirements existed (i.e., there were limits on how much investors can borrow) and that short sales were more costly than
taking long positions.
9None of the qualitative results of the model would change if we assumed the participation costs to di¤er across markets.
10The main reason we make this assumption is that foreign equity holdings that have a control motive are classied as
foreign direct investment and are not considered as portfolio investment in the literature on home equity bias to which we
want to relate (see, e.g., Ahearne et al., 2004).
11Note that, since we have normalized the supply of the risky assets to 1;  denotes both the fraction of shares held in
a company and the quantity invested in the company.
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Private benets of control consist of an amount of cash ows B (B) that the controlling shareholder
diverts from the Home (Foreign) companys cash-ows. For simplicity, we assume that B < Xmin, where
Xmin is the lower bound of the support of eX. This assumption implies that even when the realized
payo¤ is low, there is some cash ow that can be diverted.12 Larger private benets of control capture
weaker investor protection. No private benets are extracted if there is no controlling shareholder.
Our assumptions imply that the benets from stockholdings are weakly increasing in the ownership
stake. That is, we model the entrenchment e¤ect of ownership concentration. For simplicity, we ignore
the deadweight losses from the extraction of private benets and, consequently, the incentive e¤ect of
ownership concentration. As we discuss in Subsection V.B., our central results do not depend on this
assumption.
Investorsutility depends on the nal wealth, fW: The utility of controlling shareholders also depends
positively on the private benets of control. The expected utility of the Home investor can be expressed
as:
U(H ; F ; B) = E(fW )  V ar(fW )
2
+ IH>(
H)B; (1)
where  is the risk aversion parameter and IH>(
H) is an indicator function equal to 1 if H >  and
equal to zero otherwise. It captures the idea that investors can enjoy private benets of control only by
becoming controlling shareholders.
The choice variables of an investor are the portfolio allocations to the domestic and foreign risky
assets, respectively, Hand F . Choosing H >  implies that an investor becomes a controlling
shareholder. Investorsexpected utility depends on the expected nal period wealth and its variance,
which can be written as follows (under the assumption that there exists a controlling shareholder):13
E(fW ) =W0   HP   FP  + H(X  B) + F (X  B) (2)
  IH>0(H)c  IF>0(F )c
V ar(fW ) = 2X (H)2 +  F 2 ; (3)
12This assumption is quite common in the literature (see, for instance, Perotti and Von Thadden, 2006) and is done for
simplicity only. The qualitative results would not change if private benets were ex ante uncertain, although the algebra
would become more cumbersome.
13 If there is no controlling shareholder the expected wealth is E(fW ) =W0 HP FP +HX+FX IH>0(H)c 
IF>0(
F )c
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where Ia>0(a) is an indicator function equal to 1 if a > 0 and equal to zero otherwise. The expressions
for the Foreign investors are similar and are thus omitted.
To make the problem non-trivial, we assume that  is larger than the amount an investor would
nd it optimal to invest in the absence of control benets. A su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that
 > max
n
X B
2X
; X B

2X
o
:
C Timing and denition of equilibrium
The initial wealth distribution, the quality of investor protection and the distribution of asset returns
are common knowledge. The timing of events is as follows:
 At t = 0, domestic and foreign investors make their portfolio decisions. In each country, one
investor may become controlling shareholder.
 At t = 1, after risky assetsrandom payo¤s are realized and before they are distributed to portfolio
investors, controlling shareholders (if any) extract private benets of control.14
 At t = 2, payo¤s net of private benets of control are distributed to all investors.
Denition 1 An equilibrium consists of portfolio allocations and decisions whether to become control-
ling shareholders such that:
 In Home and Foreign, a large investor becomes controlling shareholder if this maximizes his ex-
pected utility. No other investor has an incentive to acquire a stake larger than the controlling
shareholders if the controlling stake is smaller than 12 .
 All investorsportfolio allocations maximize their expected utility, taking other agentschoices as
given.
 Portfolio investors take prices as given.
 Asset markets clear.
14As will be clear later, in our model investors become controlling shareholders only in order to extract private benets.
Hence, we abstract from controlling shareholdersdecision whether to extract private benets.
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IV Main results
Here, we take the perspective of the Home country. Results for the Foreign country are identical, unless
noted otherwise. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Lets dene Hoptimal 
X B P
2X
and Foptimal 
X B P 
2X
as the demands of domestic and foreign
stocks of a portfolio investor for whom the no-borrowing constraint W0  HP +FP  + 2c is not
binding in equilibrium. Our assumptions imply that  > max
n
Hoptimal; 
F
optimal
o
. Hence, in the
absence of control benets, no shareholder would nd it optimal to acquire a share of the risky asset
larger or equal to :
Proposition 1 gives conditions for the existence of controlling shareholders and describes their asset
holdings.15
Proposition 1 For given prices, a large investor is more likely to acquire control if B and w0 are
relatively high. The Home controlling shareholder demands domestic and foreign risky assets in the
following amounts: HCS   > Hoptimal and 0  FCS  Foptimal: Additionally, HCS  Hoptimal is weakly
increasing in B:
Controlling shareholders expect higher returns than portfolio investors. Hence, large investors may
choose to underdiversify their portfolio and acquire control. Unobservable private benets of control can
thus help to explain why French and Poterba (1991) nd that, based on the observed portfolio patterns,
investors seem to expect domestic stock returns to be several hundred basis points higher than what
foreign investors expect for the same markets.16
The di¤erence between the ownership stake of the controlling shareholder and the holdings of port-
folio investors increases in the level of private benets because of the e¤ect of competition for control.
For given HCS , the utility of a controlling shareholder is increasing in B. The other large shareholders
incentives to contest control thus increase in B as well. By acquiring a larger stake, the controlling
15Note that since we allow all investors to submit limit orders (demand schedules conditional on price), Proposition 1
applies to a situation where the controlling shareholder and portfolio investors make their portfolio allocation decisions
simultaneously.
16We have updated the calculations of Poterba and French for the implied expected returns by using more accurate
holdings data from the 2002 IMF Coordinated Survey of Portfolio Investment and monthly country index returns from
MSCI (from 1993 to 2002). Our results are qualitatively similar to those of French and Poterba. Domestic investors still
seem to expect signicantly higher returns from investing in their own country compared to investors from other countries.
The main di¤erence is that the implied return premium of UK investors for investing in their home country has declined
and the premium of Japanese investors for investing in Japan has substantially increased.
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shareholder makes control non-contestable.17
The wealth threshold above which an investor chooses to become a controlling shareholder di¤ers
across countries because potential controlling shareholders at Home and in Foreign face di¤erent investor
protection, equity prices, and competition for control from other large shareholders.
Corollary 1 For given wealth distributions in the domestic and foreign countries, and given prices of
the risky assets, the portfolio shares of Home portfolio investors with di¤erent levels of wealth are:
1. If W0 W (B;B; P; P ); then HPI = FPI = 0;
2. If W (B;B; P; P ) W0 < W (B;B; P; P ); then HPI 5
X B P
2X
, and FPI = 0, if X B P >
X  B   P ; HPI = 0 and FPI 5
X B P 
2X
if X  B   P < X  B   P ;
3. If W (B;B; P; P ) W0 < W (B;B; P; P ); then 0 < HPI  Hoptimal, 0 < FPI  Foptimal:
Due to the existence of participation costs and the possibility of extracting private benets of
control, individuals have di¤erent incentives to participate in the stock market and diversify their
portfolios depending on their initial wealth. The poorest investors do not buy stocks at all. Less
wealthy individuals participate only in one risky asset market. In particular, if the security returns
are higher in Foreign than at Home (i.e., X   B   P < X   B   P ), individuals with relatively
low wealth invest only in the foreign risky asset. Contrary to investors who aspire to acquire control,
portfolio investors face identical risks and returns independently from their country of residence. Foreign
and domestic portfolio investors with equal initial wealth thus hold identical portfolios.
It is useful to note that for given prices an improvement in investor protection at Home has the
following e¤ects on the demand for equity: If investor protection improves in the domestic economy,
it becomes more lucrative to invest in the domestic risky asset for the less wealthy investors, because
domestic stockspayo¤s are higher. If corporate governance at Home becomes better than in Foreign,
some individuals, who previously found it optimal to stay out of both risky asset markets, are now willing
to pay the xed participation cost c and invest in the domestic stock market. Improved domestic investor
protection also increases the incentives to invest in the domestic risky asset compared to investing
abroad. Those less wealthy investors that found it optimal to invest only in the foreign stock market
17 In equilibrium, the controlling shareholder has the same utility as the other large investor (who would be able to
contest control) if HCS <
1
2
:
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may thus be willing to switch to the domestic market or start investing in the domestic market, in
addition to the foreign market. Wealthier portfolio investors, who participate in both the domestic and
the foreign markets, are now willing to invest more at Home.
Until now, we have taken prices as given. Di¤erences in investor protection, however, a¤ect the
demand of investors with di¤erent wealth levels and, consequently, prices of risky assets at Home and
in Foreign.
The prices are determined from the following market clearing conditions:
Z W
W
HPI(W 0; P; P
)dG(W 0)+
Z W 
W 
HPI(W 0; P; P
)dG(W 0)+
H
CS(W0; P; P
) + 
H
CS(W 0; P; P
) = 1
(4)Z W 
W 
FPI(W 0; P; P
)dG(W 0)+
Z W
W
FPI(W 0; P; P
)dG(W 0)+
F
CS(W0; P; P
) + FCS(W0; P; P
) = 1:
(5)
It is not possible to derive prices in closed form without assuming a specic functional form for the
distribution of wealth. Additionally, the no-borrowing constraint implies that individual demands and,
therefore, the market clearing conditions are non linear in the asset prices. However, we can derive im-
plications on the relation between equilibrium prices and investor protection. We prove in the Appendix
that our assumptions guarantee the existence of the equilibrium.
Ownership concentration inuences the equilibrium relation between equity prices and investor pro-
tection.
Proposition 2 The relation between the price of the risky asset and quality of investor protection is
non-monotonic. If in equilibrium ownership concentration is large enough (i.e., portfolio investors
holdings are small) and B < 
2
X
2 , P is increasing in B. For lower levels of ownership concentration or
when B > 
2
X
2 , P is decreasing in B.
Proposition 2 underlines that general equilibrium e¤ects may be important for the relationship
between ownership concentration and rm valuation. An improvement in investor protection (decrease
in B) can increase the aggregate demand for stocks and therefore the stock price, if portfolio investors
hold a lot of stocks. Conversely, a decrease in investor protection can increase the aggregate demand
for stocks and the stock price, if few portfolio investors participate in the domestic stock market.
In several inuential empirical papers (see, e.g., McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer and
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Vishny, 1988), a large controlling equity share has been thought to increase rm market valuation
because it would increase the controlling shareholders incentives to maximize future cash ows.18 In
our model, ownership concentration does not increase cash ows. Nonetheless, stock prices may increase
in ownership concentration because of a general equilibrium e¤ect: when wealth is concentrated, the
aggregate demand for a risky asset increases if extracting private benets of control becomes easier. The
stock price increases because some investors try to acquire control using open-market transactions.19
Proposition 2 implies that the relationship between corporate valuations and investor protection
is ambiguous without controlling for the ownership structure. Only for give ownership concentration,
valuations are positively related to investor protection. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny
(2002) provide evidence consistent with this implication of the model.
Another important implication of the model is that the wealth distribution is important in deter-
mining which equilibrium prevails in a country.
Corollary 2 Equilibrium ownership concentration depends not only on B, but also on the wealth dis-
tribution.
As an illustration, lets consider a country with weak investor protection, but even distribution
of wealth, so that there are no large shareholders. We would then have an equilibrium in which no
individual is wealthy enough to acquire control rights. Equilibrium prices would be such that individuals
invest in the risky asset without being able to extract private benets of control. Moreover, even if the
quality of investor protection were very low, stock market participation would be high. The reason is
that there would be no diversion of cash ows, and thus investors would have a higher incentive to
participate in the risky asset market.
Changes in wealth distribution can explain why the relation between ownership concentration and
investor protection is weaker or does not hold if long periods of time are considered. Morck, Percy,
Tian and Yeung (2004) report that in Canada at the beginning of the 1900s ownership was highly
concentrated and investor protection poor. By the middle of the century, however, widely held rms had
become predominant, even though investor protection had not improved. This nding is less surprising
18 In a related paper, Lins (2003) shows that non-management blockholders increase rm valuations, especially in countries
with weak investor protection laws.
19This e¤ect is similar to Zingales (1995) who shows that, because of the probability of a corporate control contest,
ownership concentration has an e¤ect on the price of voting shares without any e¤ect on the companys cash ows. The
mechanism is, however, di¤erent. In our model, any change in the identity of the controlling shareholder (i.e., block
transactions that do not a¤ect the free-oat) would not have any e¤ect on prices.
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if one takes into account that in the same period an expanding middle class capable of investing in
shares emerged. Our model suggests that the demand for shares by the middle class increased stock
prices, and this in turn made it optimal for controlling shareholders to reduce their equity holdings.
Morck et al. (2004) also show that the prevalence of widely held rms in Canada has declined starting
from the 1970s. This coincides with the abolition of the inheritance tax in 1972 and widening wealth
inequality.20
The implications of our model are also compatible with the experience of Italy in the same period.
Aganin and Volpin (2004) report that Italian listed companies were widely held in the early 1900s.
Ownership became more concentrated only after the Great Depression, when recession and high ination
had eroded the incomes of the middle class, and hence, its ability to invest in stocks (Zamagni, 1990).
More in general, Rajan and Zingales (2003) demonstrate that there was a great reversal in nancial
development in Europe, where nancial markets were well developed before the World War I and
deteriorated afterwards. The negative impact of the Great Depression on the middle class wealth
in Europe can contribute to explain why this reversal happened, without changes in laws weakening
investor protection.
Consider now two countries where some shareholders acquire control and extract private benets.
Equity returns in a country are increasing in the level of investor protection. This is proved in Propo-
sition 3.
Proposition 3 Expected security returns at Home, X  B  P , are increasing in the level of investor
protection. Additionally, if wealth distribution is identical in both countries, security returns are higher
in the country with stronger investor protection.
Proposition 3 implies that the return to equity for portfolio investors decreases if investor protection
worsens. In other words, the price P does not decrease enough to compensate for an increase in B. The
intuition is the following: As B increases, the stock price does not fully decrease to reect the lower
security benets X   B; because of the controlling shareholders demand for stocks. The stock price
may even increase, as established by Proposition 2.
In Albuquerque and Wang (2007) expected returns are a decreasing function of investor protection
because investment increases when investor protection is poor. In the presence of investment-specic
20For the widening wealth inequality in Canada, see Kerstetter (2002).
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shocks, this increases stock return volatility. As a result also expected returns increase. Our result does
not necessarily contradict this: we suggest that expected returns are increasing in investor protection
for a given level of return volatility. Hence, risk-adjusted expected returns are lower when investor
protection is poor.
The following corollary follows immediately from Proposition 3.
Corollary 3 Domestic and Foreign portfolio investorsparticipation in the domestic stock market de-
creases as domestic investor protection gets weaker. Conversely, the higher is the quality of investor
protection in the Foreign country, the more willing are domestic and foreign portfolio investors to invest
in Foreign.
In our model, there is no di¤erence between domestic and foreign portfolio investors. All portfolio
investors have identical portfolios for given initial wealth. On aggregate, portfolio investors hold the
free-oat, as suggested by Stulz (2005). Thus, the aggregate equity holdings of portfolio investors depend
on investor protection only indirectly through the free-oat. Portfolio investors with low initial wealth,
however, underweight weak investor protection stocks even with respect to the free-oat by deciding
not to buy those stocks. For them, investor protection has an e¤ect that goes beyond the free-oat,
because these investors choose not to hold stocks in rms with higher extraction of private benets and
lower expected returns.
For given wealth distribution, domestic portfolio investorsparticipation in the domestic stock market
is lower in countries with poor investor protection because they o¤er lower security returns. This implies
that portfolio investors from countries with weak investor protection invest abroad more than portfolio
investors from countries with stronger investor protection. To put it di¤erently, they exhibit a good
country bias.
Even though we identify a good country bias for portfolio investors, our model exhibits home equity
bias in the aggregate because wealthy investors have stronger incentives to invest in domestic stocks in
poorer investor protection countries. The home equity bias, however, does not necessarily become less
severe as investor protection improves. If investor protection is strong at Home but weak in Foreign,
portfolio investors, including the domestic ones, are more willing to invest at Home. This counterbal-
ances the fact that the very wealthy have stronger incentives to diversify internationally, instead of
acquiring control.21
21The extent of home equity bias depends once again on wealth distribution.
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V Extensions and robustness
A Perfectly integrated market for control
So far, we have assumed that the markets for the control of the risky assets are segmented. This
assumption has some empirical support as foreign ownership restrictions often limit outsiderspossibility
to acquire control stakes. Biases of domestic judges and politicians favoring domestic stakeholders may
also induce segmentation in the market for control (Bhattacharya, Galpin, and Haslem, 2007). Finally,
regulation in the domestic country may limit extraction of private benets by controlling shareholders
from strong investor protection countries.
Complete segmentation of the market for control is, however, a too strong assumption. We observe
cross-country acquisitions and large ows of foreign direct investment, which may enable extraction of
private benets in other countries. Therefore, this Section modies the analysis and assumes that the
market for control is perfectly integrated. Now foreign (domestic) controlling shareholders are allowed
to enjoy private benets at Home (in Foreign). Hence, they might choose FCS >  and 
H
CS > :
For simplicity, we assume that large investors can acquire control only in one country. Proposition
1 and Corollary 1 easily extend to this context because the incentives to acquire control are similar
for domestic and foreign investors. The demand for the risky assets still comes from controlling share-
holders and portfolio investors and the equilibrium conditions (4) and (5) are only slightly modied
(the nationality of controlling shareholders may change but not the functional form of their demands).
Hence, allowing for an integrated market for control does not a¤ect the mechanisms driving our main
results. In particular, Proposition 2 and 3 still hold. Since private benets of control are reected in
the market price, security returns continue to be lower when corporate governance is weaker. Also,
portfolio investors invest less in countries with weak corporate governance.
Since only the holdings of foreign portfolio investors are taken into account in studies documenting
the home equity bias while foreign holdings of control blocks are classied as foreign direct investment 
our model can still explain the home equity bias. Note however that if the market for control is perfectly
integrated there is no longer a connection between domestic wealth distribution and extraction of private
benets. If no domestic investors are wealthy enough to acquire control in weak investor protection
countries, foreign wealthy investors may be able to extract private benets.
Proposition 4 describes the equilibrium.
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Proposition 4 Assume that there is extraction of private benets in both countries and B > B, then
in equilibrium:
1. Ownership is more concentrated at Home;
2. Participation of portfolio investors is larger in Foreign;
3. Security returns are lower at Home than in Foreign;
4. If wealth distribution is identical in both countries, Home receives net inows of foreign direct
investment, while Foreign receives net inows of portfolio investment.
The model with integrated market for control generates an interesting implication for the directions
of portfolio ows and foreign direct investment. While portfolio investors have a good country bias
in selecting their equity investment, controlling shareholders exhibit a bad country bias, meaning that
ceteris paribus they prefer to invest in weak investor protection countries. This suggest that portfolio
ows and foreign direct investment may be substitutes and that the type of investment a country re-
ceives depends on investor protection. Consistently, comparing the experiences of Poland and the Czech
Republic, Desai and Moel (2008) note that the Czech Republic receives more foreign direct investment
and less portfolio investment than Poland, which o¤ers stronger investor protection. Other empirical
evidence also supports this implication of the model. Kelley and Woidtke (2005), for instance, show
that foreign direct investments of U.S. multinationals are predominantly in countries with weak investor
protection. Similarly, Rossi and Volpin (2004) nd that acquisition targets are typically from countries
with poorer shareholder protection than their acquirers. The contrary is true for portfolio ows. For in-
stance, the portfolio ows of U.S. investors are directed primarily to strong investor protection countries
(Leuz et al., 2008).
B Other determinants of ownership concentration
So far, we have modelled the entrenchment e¤ects of ownership concentration. In our model, for
given wealth distribution, weaker investor protection leads to higher demand for stocks for control
reasons. Our results on the relation between investor protection, equity returns and portfolio investors
stockholdings would be invariant if greater insider ownership reduced extraction of private benets in
equilibrium. In this case, weaker investor protection would also lead to more concentrated ownership
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(just like in Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). Thus, independently from the specic mechanism leading
to more concentrated ownership, investor protection a¤ects the supply of stocks to portfolio investors,
security returns and portfolio decisions in the way we highlight.
C Discussion of the remaining hypotheses
Our assumptions imply that in equilibrium neither the supply nor the demand for stocks are perfectly
elastic. This is compatible with the empirical evidence showing that demand shocks a¤ect stock prices
(Shleifer, 1986; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; and Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002). Additionally, we also
need to assume that the market for portfolio investors and controlling shareholders is not completely
segmented. We hypothesize that there is only one market clearing price for stocks. We do not consider
that the price of control blocks often deviates from the open market price of stocks. Our results
are robust to considering a market for control blocks. It su¢ ces for our purposes that controlling
shareholders trade in the open market as well as in the market for controlling blocks. This is in fact
what actually happens, since it is cheaper for investors with a control interest to assemble part of a
block in the open market.22 Moreover, changes in ownership concentration have to necessarily pass
through the open market as they are equivalent to changes in the free-oat.
Similarly, we assume that there is only one class of shares, so that there is no separation between
cash ow and voting rights. Hence, there are no di¤erent stocks for portfolio investors and controlling
shareholders. This assumption is not very restrictive, since dual shares are far from being predominant.
For example, Dyck and Zingales (2004) report that in the countries that allow two classes of shares only
14 percent of companies actually has dual class shares. Additionally, when dual class shares are used,
super-voting shares are often traded also by portfolio investors. Hence, the e¤ects highlighted in the
model would hold for those shares.
These are the only assumptions that we really need. All the other assumptions we make are not
essential and are done only for simplicity. All our results would still hold with di¤erent utility functions,
although the model would be less tractable. Furthermore, we could assume a di¤erent technology for
the extraction of private benets of control.
The interpretation of the model can also be generalized. In the exposition, we concentrate on
individual investors direct shareholdings. The analysis would be similar, if we considered indirect
22For example, in the context of takeovers Betton and Eckbo (2000) show that bidders, who by denition have a control
interest, are likely to trade in the open market by acquiring a toehold before launching a takeover bid.
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shareholdings through mutual funds and mutual funds were not able to distribute private benets of
control to their investors. As a consequence, mutual funds would be rarer in countries with poor legal
environment, as Khorana, Servaes and Tufano (2005) document.
Finally, we have framed the model as an analysis of two countries with separate stock markets. An-
other interpretation would be that it deals with di¤erent risky assets within a country. According to this
interpretation, portfolio investors should be less likely to hold stocks of companies in which extraction
of private benets of control is expected to be larger. Interestingly, using individual shareholdings in
Swedish companies, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) nd that outside investors hold a smaller proportion
of their portfolios in weak corporate governance rms.
VI Empirical evidence
Our model has several implications on equity returns and portfolio holdings of di¤erent investors in
relation to investor protection. Ceteris paribus, the following relations hold:
1. Equity returns are lower in weak investor protection countries (Proposition 3);
2. Foreigners hold less equity in countries with poor investor protection (Corollary 3);
3. Household participation in the domestic market is lower in countries with poor investor protection
(Corollary 3);
4. In countries with poor investor protection, portfolio investors hold relatively more foreign equity
(Corollary 3).
The existing literature o¤ers plenty of evidence on the rst two points. Our model is consistent with
the growing empirical evidence showing that weaker investor protection is associated with lower stock
returns in the U.S. (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Core, Guay and Rusticus, 2006; Cremers and
Nair, 2005; Yermack, 2006; Cremers, Nair and John, 2007). Note that our model implies a positive
relation between stock returns and investor protection only for countries with similar wealth distrib-
ution. In this respect, the model may be more useful in rationalizing di¤erences in returns between
portfolios of weak and strong corporate governance companies within the same country. Thus, our
model does not necessarily contrast with the results of Hail and Leuz (2006) or Daouk, Lee and Ng
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(2006), who show that expected returns are higher in poor corporate governance countries. Moreover,
the country-level evidence is ambiguous, since Lombardo and Pagano (1999) nd that countries with
weak investor protection have lower stock returns.
There exists empirical evidence also in support of the second implication. Dahlquist et al. (2003)
show that the prevalence of closely held rms in countries with poor investor protection explains part
of the home bias of U.S. investors, and that the world free-oat portfolio available to investors who
are not controlling shareholders is more important than the world market portfolio in explaining the
portfolio weights of U.S. investors. This is exactly what our model implies: if investors who can enjoy
private benets of control have a large demand for shares, the holdings of portfolio investors are lower
as a consequence.
Our theory is also consistent with the nding that the quality of corporate governance matters
directly for individual (as opposed to aggregate) investors portfolio decisions. Several authors (see
Giannetti and Simonov, 2006; Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki, 2005; Daouk et al., 2006; Leuz et al.,
2008; Kim, Sung and Wei, 2007; and Li, Ortiz-Molina and Zhao, 2007) show that portfolio investors
hold less equity in companies and countries with weaker corporate governance, even after controlling
for the free-oat. In the light of our model, this evidence suggests that investor protection a¤ects not
only the free-oat, but also the participation decision of portfolio investors. Due to lower wealth, assets
under management or higher participation costs, some investors decide not to invest in stocks that o¤er
weaker investor protection.
We dedicate the rest of this section to provide empirical evidence on the third and fourth implications
of our model, which, to the best of our knowledge, have not been explored in existing empirical studies.
A Participation in the domestic market
Lack of data has prevented international comparisons of households portfolio choices. Guiso et al.
(2001 and 2003) make a rst attempt to compare cross-country di¤erences in stock market participation.
Using household surveys from France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S., they show that
there are sizable di¤erences in stock market participation rates across countries. As our model would
predict, di¤erences are larger for poor and middle-class households. Rich households always have high
participation rates.
We gather domestic investorsparticipation rates in the domestic stock market for a larger set of
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countries that we list in Table 1 with the corresponding data sources.
[Insert Table 1]
These data have several drawbacks: we do not have information on indirect holdings. In addition,
the data refer to di¤erent years (between 1997 and 2000). Although these caveats have to be kept
in mind, we believe that it is valuable to provide international evidence on household stock market
participation, especially since prior evidence is so sparse. Moreover, the lack of information on indirect
stockholdings should not bias our results, since Guiso et al. (2003) nd that nancial intermediaries are
less developed in countries where stock market participation is low.
[Insert Table 2]
Table 2 shows that stronger investor protection is indeed associated with higher stock market partic-
ipation.23 The e¤ect is not only statistically signicant, but also economically relevant as, for instance
in column (1) of Panel A, our proxy for investor protection, the anti-director rights index, explains 48
percent of the variance in stock market participation rates.
We control for a number of country characteristics that may a¤ect the decision to hold domestic
equity.24 Investors may participate in the stock market to a greater extent in richer countries. We thus
include the logarithm of GDP per capita as a control. Moreover, since investors may have stronger
incentives to participate in the stock market if it is larger and o¤ers more opportunities, we control for
the size of the market by including the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. We also control for
the adult populations average years of schooling, as better educated individuals are more inclined to
hold stocks (Guiso, 2001). Finally, our model implies that wealth distribution matters. Hence, we include
the Gini coe¢ cient of income.25 In all specications, the proxy for investor protection is positive and
statistically signicant. The result does not depend on the presence of outliers, since estimates remain
23Alternatively, we could relate household participation to equity returns. Since it is di¢ cult to obtain clean measures
of expected equity returns, we prefer to relate equity holdings to proxies for the exogenous parameters of our model.
24When we include controls, we lose some observations due to missing variables for some countries. Including the mutual
fund assets as a share of GDP as a control would further reduce our sample, but would not change the parameter estimates.
For this reason, we chose not to include this additional control in the regressions we report.
25 Ideally, we would like to control for the Gini coe¢ cient of wealth, which unfortunately is unavailable for a large
cross-section of countries.
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qualitatively invariant if we use the Hubers (1964) estimator that is robust to the presence of outliers
(Columns (5) and (6) in Panel A of Table 2).
In Panel B of Table 2, we substitute the anti-director rights index with a number of di¤erent measures
of investor protection, which are summarized in the caption of Table 2. Investor protection still has a
positive e¤ect on domestic investorsparticipation in the domestic stock market. Interestingly, we nd
that investorsability to privately enforce their own rights is more important than public enforcement
for domestic investors participation decision. The index of public enforcement is the only measure
of investor protection that is not statistically signicant. This is fully consistent with La Porta et al.
(2006) who nd little evidence that public enforcement benets stock markets, while laws mandating
disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules matter.
Our estimates suggest that the correlation between investor protection and the proportion of do-
mestic households who hold domestic stocks is robust and consistent with the third implication of our
model. However, given the limited sample of cross-sectional data, it is di¢ cult to establish that the
e¤ect is causal and to rule out that omitted factors a¤ect our estimates.26 Nevertheless, we attempt to
establish that a causal relationship exists using instrumental variables.
To capture the exogenous component of investor protection, we use the categories of legal origin
provided by La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998). They note that most countries can be divided into
countries with predominantly English, French, German or Scandinavian legal origin and that countries
typically obtained their legal system through occupation or colonization. La Porta et al. show that
legal origin helps to explain cross-country di¤erences in investor protection.27 Legal origin is unlikely
to have a direct e¤ect on portfolio decisions, especially because we control for nancial development.
Thus, we can use legal origin to construct instruments. Our instruments for the investor protection
proxy are three dummy variables that take value 1 if a country has, respectively, English, French or
German legal origin. The estimates in column (7) of Panel A in Table 2 suggest a positive causal e¤ect
of investor protection on the proportion of domestic investors who hold domestic stocks. Moreover,
26Since our main proxy for investor protection, the anti-director rights index, is predetermined with respect to the
participation rates, reverse causality problems are less of a concern. In fact, La Porta et al. (1997) compute the index for
the rst half of the 1990s, while householdsparticipation rates increased dramatically in the second half of the decennium
(Guiso et al., 2003). Hence, it is unlikely that in countries with high participation rates households lobbied for better
investor protection. Nor can the results on foreign holdings in the next subsection be subject to this criticism, as foreigners
cannot vote for improvements in investor protection.
27As the F-test of excluded instruments reported in Table 2 shows, legal origin performs well in explaining investor
protection also in our sample.
22
since the equation is overidentied, we can test overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan test suggests
that the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. This increases our condence
that a causal e¤ect of investor protection on domestic householdsdecision to hold domestic equity is
not at odds with the empirical evidence.
B Foreign equity holdings
We start to explore the fourth implication using the 2002 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
(CPIS), undertaken by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). From the survey, we obtain domestic
holdings of foreign equity and foreign holdings of domestic equity for a wide range of countries.28
Our model implies that the good country bias emerges only for portfolio investors (and not in the
aggregate). We compute the percentage of market capitalization that is closely held using the average
of the percentage of closely held shares for rms reported in Worldscope, similarly to Dahlquist et al.
(2003). Then, we calculate a proxy for the holdings of domestic and foreign portfolio investors using
the percentage of stock market capitalization that is not closely held. The share of foreign equity in the
portfolios of domestic investors who are not controlling shareholders is calculated as follows:
dFPI = Domestic Holdings of Foreign Equity
(1-% Closely Held Market Cap.)Market Cap. +
Domestic Holdings of Foreign Equity- Foreign Holdings of Domestic Equity
:
Our estimates of dFPI are reported in Table 1. In countries where investor protection as measured by
the index of private enforcement is above the median, domestic portfolio investors hold on average 33
percent of their portfolio in foreign stocks. In countries with investor protection below the median, the
percentage of foreign stocks in the portfolio of domestic portfolio investors is 60 percent. The di¤erence
is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level.
However, this cannot be interpreted as evidence in favor of our model. According to the international
capital asset pricing model, investors should hold equity in proportion to a countrys weight in the world
market portfolio (i.e., in proportion to the relative supply of stocks). Thus, the di¤erence in foreign
equity holdings could just indicate that weak investor protection countries have smaller stock markets.
28This measure of foreign equity is unlikely to include any wealth that individuals illegally keep abroad to avoid taxes
in the domestic country. Hence, our results should not depend on the fact that individuals often invest abroad for tax
reasons.
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For this reason, as suggested by Ahearne et al. (2004), we measure the home equity bias as 1 minus
the ratio of the weight of foreign equity in the portfolio of investors from a given country (dFPI) to
the foreign countries weight in the world market capitalization. The home equity bias is still less
pronounced in weak investor protection countries, where it is, on average, 39 percent, than in strong
investor protection countries, where the bias reaches, on average, 65 percent. The di¤erence is once
again statistically signicant at the 5 percent level.
Since the supply of stocks to portfolio investors is best captured by the free oat (Dahlquist et
al., 2003 and Kho et al., 2006), we also measure the home equity bias in investors portfolios as 1
minus the ratio of the weight of foreign equity in the portfolio of investors from a given country (dFPI)
to the foreign countriesweight in the free-oat world market capitalization. We nd that in weak
investor protection countries the home bias is, on average, 42 percent, but it averages 62 percent in
strong investor protection countries. The di¤erence, even though less pronounced, is still statistically
signicant at 10 percent level.29
These di¤erences suggest that while the home equity bias that clearly has many other determinants
beyond the ones highlighted by our modelalways exists, it is less pronounced in weak investor protection
countries. Even though informative, the above measures of home equity bias could be biased by the
foreign equity holdings of controlling shareholders, which we cannot single out using the CPIS. For this
reason, we further explore the validity of the fourth implication of our model using a dataset compiled
by Thomson Financial Securities Data (TFSD).30 This dataset includes the equity holdings of mutual
funds and other institutional investors and allows us to focus on the foreign equity holdings of investors
who enjoy only security benets. Our data consist of the investorsequity holdings as of December 31,
2002 and includes investments from 31 countries.
We compute the portfolio shares that all institutional investors incorporated in a given country
(origin) have in another country (target). Note that the fact that institutional investors from di¤erent
countries may be di¤erently represented in the dataset or even that countries di¤er in the level of
nancial intermediation should not be a problem, since we standardize the holdings of all institutional
investors in a country using their total assets and study the portfolio shares of an average institutional
29Results are similar when we use alternative measures of shareholdersrights. In all cases, it is crucial to distinguish
the holdings of controlling shareholders by correcting the denominator for the percentage of closely held shares. If we did
not use this correction, we would nd the opposite. This would be consistent with our model that suggests that the home
equity bias always prevails in the aggregate.
30Chan et al. (2005) use the same cross-sectional data source.
24
investor.
To control for di¤erences in the supply of stocks across countries, we dene our dependent variable
as 1 minus the ratio of the weight of the target country in the portfolio of a given origin countrys
institutional investors to the weight of the target country in the world market capitalization or in the
free-oat world market capitalization.
We relate these measures of home equity bias to investor protection in the origin and target countries.
Since we are particularly concerned that the proxies for investor protection may be correlated with the
size of the stock market in target and origin countries, in all regressions we include the weight of target
and origin countries in the world market capitalization or in the free-oat portfolio.31
Furthermore, in order to be as conservative as possible in evaluating our theorys fourth implication,
we cluster standard errors at the country of origin level. Since we aim to test whether portfolio investors
from weaker investor protection countries hold more foreign equity, our main variable of interest only
varies between countries of origin. As pointed out by Moulton (1990), if we did not cluster errors at the
country of origin level, measurement errors could bias the standard errors of our estimates downward.32
[Insert Table 3 and Table 4]
The main variables are summarized in Table 3. Consistently with the fourth implication of our
theory, Table 4 shows that investors based in countries with weaker investor protection invest more
abroad. This holds whether we control for size by using the weight in the world market capitalization
(Column (1) of Panel A) or the weight in the free-oat world market capitalization (all the other
specications) and for di¤erent proxies for investor protection. Once again, the ability to privately
enforce ones own rights is more important than public enforcement (Column (4) of Panel A): The
latter partially o¤sets the positive e¤ect of private enforcement on the measure of home equity bias.
This nding is not completely surprising in the light of La Porta et al.s (2006) result that public
enforcement is unimportant for stock market development as well as of our previous nding that public
enforcement does not increase domestic investorsparticipation in the domestic stock market.
The results are not only statistically, but also economically signicant. In Column (2) of Panel A, if
the measure of investor protection in the origin country increases by one standard deviation, the home
31The results presented in Table 4 are qualitatively invariant if we exclude these controls.
32This concern turns out not to be relevant here, because the signicance of our estimates is similar if we do not cluster
standard errors or if we cluster at the destination country level.
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bias in investors portfolios increases by nearly 10 percentage points with respect to the median.
It is important to note that when we dene the bias with respect to the countrys weight in the
world market portfolio (Column (1) of Panel A), our estimates suggest that weak investor protection at
Home induces the institutional investors in our sample to under-weight domestic equity. Nevertheless,
they could still hold domestic stocks in proportion to their weight in the free-oat market capitalization,
as our model implies that all portfolio investors should do in the aggregate. Interestingly, though, the
rest of our estimates in which we dene the bias with respect to a countrys weight in the free-oat
market capitalization suggest that, ceteris paribus, the institutional investors in our sample underweight
domestic stocks also with respect to the weight in the free-oat market capitalization. Thus, some
institutional investors participate in the domestic stock market to a lesser degree and invest more in
foreign equity when their rights are poorly protected.
Institutional investors, however, appear to distribute their foreign equity holdings in proportion to
the target countriesweight in the free-oat world market capitalization. In fact, only in two specica-
tions (Column (7) of Panel A and Column (5) of Panel B), the home equity bias is signicantly lower
when the target country has stronger investor protection, once we control for the target countrys weight
in the free-oat world market capitalization. According to our model, in this case, a further negative
e¤ect of investor protection in the target country on portfolio investorsforeign equity holdings would
indicate that the category of investors we are analyzing is more discouraged to hold stocks than other
portfolio investors. We nd no evidence of this for the foreign institutional investors in our sample.
We control for various characteristics of target and origin countries that may a¤ect foreign equity
holdings, such as the market capitalization to GDP in the origin country to further account for the
supply of assets at Home; the logarithm of the distance between the main nancial centres of each pair
of countries to capture the fact that investors hold more assets in proximate countries; and measures
of capital controls (both restrictions to foreign capital inows and access to foreign capital markets for
domestic investors).33
While the estimates in Panel A of Table 4 suggest that weak investor protection in the Home country
decreases the home equity bias of domestic portfolio investors, we are aware that omitted factors could
drive our estimates. To mitigate the concerns that the correlations we show are spurious, in Panel B
of Table 4 we perform a set of robustness checks by controlling in turn for variables that are known to
33Because of missing variables, the number of observations varies across specications.
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a¤ect foreign portfolio investment and can potentially be correlated with investor protection.34
First, we include the previous years stock return in target and origin countries and the stock
return correlation (Column (1)). Higher returns in both the origin and target countries decrease the
home bias as, more surprisingly, does a higher return correlation. The latter probably captures the
similarity between target and origin countries. In other (not reported) specications, we also include
stock turnover or the aggregate mutual fundsassets as a share of GDP both in the origin and target
stock markets. These additional control variables are never signicant. In all cases, the estimate of our
variable of interest remains qualitatively invariant.
Second, we control for economic performance by including GDP per capita and the previous years
GDP growth (Column (2)). The home bias is less pronounced when target and origin countries have
higher GDP per capita. Moreover, as expected, target countries with high growth attract more foreign
investment, while investors from countries with high growth invest less abroad. We still nd, however,
that investors from strong investor protection countries invest less abroad.
Third, since familiarity is known to breed investment, we control for whether the target and origin
countries have the same legal origin and whether they share the language or one of the countries was
colonized by the other (Column (3)). The latter variable capturing cultural similarity indeed decreases
the home equity bias, as one would expect. However, the parameter estimate of our variable of interest
is once again una¤ected. The economic and statistical signicance of our variable of interest is not
a¤ected (estimates not reported) if we include also proxies for economic proximity (such as the origin
countrys percentage of exports to the target country) or industrial proximity (such as the correlation
of industry rankings for each pair of countries).
Fourth, since our theory suggests that wealth distribution matters for portfolio decisions, we control
for the Gini coe¢ cient of income in the country of origin (Column (4)). Interestingly, the home bias
of portfolio investors appears less pronounced when resources are more unevenly distributed. This is
consistent with the models prediction that when some investors have resources to become controlling
shareholders, domestic portfolio investors have weaker incentives to invest at Home. More importantly,
we still nd that stronger investor protection in the origin country increases the home equity bias.
Fifth, countries that are more open to international trade may also be more inclined to invest in
foreign nancial assets and, at the same time, receive more foreign investment. We measure a countrys
34Since many of these control variables, such as measures of economic performance and stock returns, are highly correlated
with each other, we include them in turns.
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openness to international trade using the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. The
new control variables have the expected sign, but only minimal statistical and economic signicance.
More importantly, not only strong investor protection in the country of origin and home equity bias are
still positively associated, but also investor protection in the target country appears to increase that
countrys weight in the portfolios of institutional investors.
Sixth, in a recent paper, Desai and Dharmapala (2007) suggest that foreign portfolio investment
may be lower towards countries with low corporate tax rates, as multinational companies have stronger
incentives to directly invest in these countries for tax reasons, and thus investors do not need to hold
foreign stocks themselves if they wish to diversify. For this reason, we include the corporate tax rate
in the origin and target country (Column (6)). We nd little evidence that corporate tax rates in
the target country a¤ect the extent of the home equity bias, while investors from countries with high
corporate tax rates hold less foreign equity, possibly because multinational companies originating from
these countries have stronger incentives to invest abroad. In other specications that we do not report
for brevity, we examine the e¤ect of capital gains and dividend taxes and proxies for tax compliance in
the origin and target countries. They are never statistically signicant, and, once again, the estimates
of our variable of interest remain qualitatively invariant.
Finally, we explore to what extent our results are driven by emerging markets where the tendency
to invest abroad may be explained by political uncertainty and economic and nancial volatility more
than by the mechanisms that we highlight in our theory. For this reason, we restrict the sample to
institutional investors from OECD economies (Column (7)). We nd that, if anything, our results
are stronger. This is an important result because by restricting the sample to OECD economies we
exclude emerging markets with small weight in term of free-oat world market capitalization. Thus,
this conrms that our results are unlikely to be explained by the size of the stock market in the country
of origin. Results are also qualitatively invariant if we directly control for the e¤ects of economic and
nancial volatility using nancial and economic risk ratings (estimates not reported).35
If unobservable determinants of foreign equity holdings drove our results, one would expect that
increasing the set of control variables or varying the sample of countries had a large impact on the e¤ect
of investor protection as the additional control variables may be correlated with the omitted factors. In
35Our estimates are equally una¤ected if in the whole sample we include a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if
the origin country exports oil. While oil exporters may invest oil revenues abroad, the dummy variable is not statistically
signicant.
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fact, our estimates are almost invariant. This suggests that the e¤ect of domestic investor protection
on foreign equity holdings is unlikely to depend on unobserved heterogeneity.
In Panel C, we make a more direct attempt to establish a causal relationship between domestic
investor protection and foreign equity holdings using instrumental variables. In Columns (1) to (3), we
construct instrumental variables based on legal origin, as we do in Subsection V.A. Our instruments for
investor protection in the origin and target countries are six dummy variables that take value 1 if the
origin or target country has, respectively, English, French, or German legal origin. The estimates suggest
a positive causal e¤ect of investor protection on the home equity bias. The parameter estimate is larger
than in the ordinary least squares regressions, suggesting that measurement errors and omitted factors
may bias our estimates downward. The F-test of excluded instruments implies that our instruments are
not weak. Additionally, when we test the overidentifying restrictions, the Sargan test does not allow
us to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. This increases our condence that the
empirical evidence is consistent with the fourth implication of our model.
Since our sample includes countries that were former European colonies, we can provide an al-
ternative test of our theorys fourth implication. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) note that
Europeans adopted very di¤erent colonization policies in di¤erent colonies, with di¤erent associated
institutions. In places where European faced high mortality rates, because of the disease environment,
they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions that have persisted to the
present. In contrast, in places where Europeans faced a more hospitable environment, they put strong
emphasis on property rights that may still a¤ect todays level of investor protection. Acemoglu et al.
(2001) provide evidence that this is indeed the case.
For this reason, in Columns (4) to (6), we instrument the di¤erent proxies for investor protection
using the settlersmortality rate from Acemoglu et al. (2001). Even though our sample is greatly reduced
(as the instruments are not dened for countries that were not former colonies), the instruments are
not weak and the estimates conrm our previous nding that the home bias is more pronounced in
countries with strong investor protection.36
Overall, the consistency of our results across di¤erent samples, di¤erent denitions of the dependent
variable, di¤erent controls for omitted factors, di¤erent estimation methods37, and di¤erent sets of
36 In this case, we are unable to test overidentifying restrictions because the equation is exactly identied.
37Outliers do not appear to be a concern also because our estimates are invariant when we use Hubers (1964) estimator
that is robust to the presence of outliers.
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instruments suggests a robust causal e¤ect of investor protection in the country of origin on the Home
equity bias in institutional investorsportfolios.
In this respect, it is also worthwhile to note that alternative explanations would have a hard time in
reconciling our empirical ndings on domestic households participation in the domestic stock market and
on portfolio investorsforeign equity holdings. Guiso et al. (2003), for instance, argue that di¤erences
in stock market participation rates across countries may depend on di¤erences in participation costs.
It may well be that participation costs are higher in countries with poor investor protection. These
may even lead portfolio investors to use foreign nancial intermediaries thus providing an alternative
explanation of the evidence based on aggregate data. However, a di¤erence in participation costs cannot
explain why in countries with weak investor protection, domestic nancial institutions hold more foreign
equity that in countries with high investor protection, without making an assumption that in countries
where investors rights are poorly protected, the xed costs associated to buying foreign equity are
relatively lower than in countries with higher investor protection. Our explanation based on the relative
payo¤ from domestic and foreign investments allows a more parsimonious explanation of these di¤erent
aspects of portfolio choices.
VII Conclusions
To our knowledge, this is the rst paper that studies in a theoretical model the e¤ect of investor
protection on the demand for equity. We show that the explicit consideration of the demand for
equity is important for understanding why investor protection a¤ects positively stock returns. Stock
prices reect the demand for equity of controlling shareholders and portfolio investors alike. Wealthy
individuals are relatively more willing to acquire control when investor protection is weaker. Stock
prices are thus too high and expected returns too low with respect to the cash ows distributed to
all shareholders. Lower expected returns for portfolio investors lead to lower stock market participation
rates in the domestic market.
This suggests a rationale why companies issue voting and non-voting shares. Investors buy non-
voting shares exclusively for portfolio reasons. Hence, their price reects only future cash ows after
the extraction of private benets, and not the demand from investors who wish to acquire control.
Consequently, having non-voting shares may make it easier to attract portfolio investors, for whom the
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mere security return of voting shares would be too low.
Not only our theory can explain why weak investor protection leads to lower expected returns, but
also generates implications on domestic and foreign equity holdings that are consistent with existing
empirical studies as well as with novel empirical evidence that we present. Cross-sectional data indeed
suggest that investor protection explains some of the di¤erences in households participation rates across
countries and that portfolio investors from weaker investor protection countries hold more foreign equity
in their portfolios.
In this respect, our paper indicates new avenues to a growing literature analyzing the e¤ects of
investor protection on portfolio choices. While the literature has focused on how investor protection in
the target countries a¤ects incentives to hold equity, we suggest that the e¤ects of nancial reform at
Home may be equally important. We leave to future research to explore how nancial reforms shape
the portfolio of institutional and individual investors within a country.
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VIII Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Here, we take the equilibrium prices as given and derive the strategies of large investors.
Dene V as the indirect utility function of a large investor. A large investor compares his utility from
becoming a controlling shareholder with the utility from diversifying his portfolio. If at the equilibrium
prices the private benets of control are too small for compensating the loss of diversication, no investor
becomes controlling shareholder irrespective of the initial wealth. If instead private benets of control
are large enough and the no-borrowing constraint does not bind, the investor buys a controlling stake
HCS  :
A.1 Payo¤ of a large shareholder without control
To obtain the payo¤ of a large investor without control (E(V jportfolio)), we maximize the large in-
vestors expected utility under the budget constraint and the no short-sale constraint (FP  + HP +
2c W0; H > 0; F > 0). The Lagrangian associated to this problem is:
L = HPI (X  B) + FPI (X  B) +W0   HP   FP   
1
2
2X
 
HPI
2
+
 
FPI
2
+
+1
 
W0   FP    HP   2c

;
where 1 is the Lagrange multiplier. The rst order conditions are:
X  B   P   2XHPI   1P = 0
X  B   P    2XFPI   1P  = 0:
In solving the model, we focus on the case in which the no-borrowing constraint is not binding for a
large investor who decides to diversify his portfolio.38 Hence, his demands are Hoptimal =
X B P
2X
and
Foptimal =
X B P 
2X
.
38This is always true if w0 is large. Computations are signicantly more cumbersome otherwise, but the main trust of
the paper would not change.
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A.2 Payo¤ of a large shareholder with control
We obtain the payo¤ of a large investor with control (E(V jcontrol)) by maximizing the large investors
utility under the budget constraint, the no-borrowing constraint, H > , and the constraint that
implies that control is not contestable, which we derive below:
Non-contestability of control The controlling shareholder actually has control only if the other
large investor has no incentive to acquire a larger stake. Since the two large investors of a country are
identical, the equilibrium controlling stake, if a controlling shareholder exists, is the minimum between
50 percent and the HCS that satises E(V jcontrol) = E(V jportfolio): The latter condition implies that
the other large investor is indi¤erent between being diversied and being able to extract private benets
of control. Therefore, he has no incentive to contest control. Assume that the no-borrowing constraint
is not binding for a large investor even if he acquires control. As we will prove later, if this is true,
FCS = 
F
optimal
The condition E(V jcontrol) = E(V jportfolio) can be written as follows:
W0 +B +

X  B   P 
2X

(X  B   P ) + (X  B   P )HCS (6)
 1
2
2X
  
HCS
2
+

X  B   P 
2X
2!
= W0 +

X  B   P 
2X

(X  B   P ) +

X  B   P
2X

(X  B   P )
 1
2
2X
 
X  B   P
2X
2
+

X  B   P 
2X
2!
;
where W0 is the initial wealth of a large investor.
The previous equation can be simplied as follows:
 1
2
2X
 
HCS
2
+ (X  B   P )HCS +B  
1
2
(X  B   P )
2X
2
= 0:
Solving the previous equality, we obtain HCS =
(X B P )+
p
22XB
2X
:39 Hence, the constraint implying
non-contestability of control is:
39Note that the solution to our problem is the larger root of the second order equation. In fact, the smaller root implies
that HCS < 
H
optimal:
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HCS = min
8<:(X  B   P ) +
q
22XB
2X
;
1
2
9=; : (7)
Stock demands The Lagrangian associated to the problem of a controlling shareholder is:
L = HCS (X  B) +B + FCS (X  B) +W0   HP   FP   
1
2
2X
 
HCS
2
+
 
FCS
2
+1
 
W0   FP    HP   2c

+2
 
HCS   

+3
0@HCS  min
8<:(X  B   P ) +
q
22XB
2X
;
1
2
9=;
1A ;
where 1; 2; 3 are the Lagrange multipliers. The rst order conditions are:
X  B   P   2XHCS   1P + 2 + 3 = 0
X  B   P    2XHCS   1P  = 0:
The following considerations help to solve the above problem. First, if large investorsinitial wealth
is relatively low, the no-borrowing constraint (FP  + HP + 2c  W0) is not satised if H = .
Hence, the problem has no solution with the constraint H >  and nobody can become controlling
shareholder. Second, if HCS <
1
2 , either 2 or 3 are necessarily strictly greater than zero, depending
on whether  R (X B P )+
p
22XB
2X
: Third, note that if  >
(X B P )+
p
22XB
2X
; the large investor
has higher utility from being a portfolio investor. Hence, even if the above problem has solution
nobody becomes a controlling shareholder. Finally, if  <
(X B P )+
p
22XB
2X
, the assumption that
 > max
n
Hoptimal; 
F
optimal
o
guarantees that 3 > 0:
Hence, if we focus on an equilibrium in which a controlling shareholder exists,  <
(X B P )+
p
22XB
2X
and the no-borrowing constraint is not binding (1 = 0), the solution is:
HCS = min
8<:(X  B   P ) +
q
22XB
2X
;
1
2
9=;
FCS = 
F
optimal
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In general, the demand for stocks of the controlling shareholder increases in B if B < 
2
X
2 ; 
H
CS  
Hoptimal is weakly increasing in B for any parameter values.
A.3 Large investorsequilibrium strategies
So far, we have maximized the expected utility of large investors for given prices. Since investors
compete submitting demand schedules conditional on price (limit orders), their strategy implies a level
of demand for equilibrium and out-of equilibrium prices.
Dene P eq the equilibrium price level. The strategy of the large investor who becomes controlling
shareholder involves demanding
HCS = min
8<:(X  B   P ) +
q
22XB
2X
;
1
2
9=;
for any price P .
The large shareholder who remains a portfolio investor demands H = Hoptimal if P  P eq and
H = FCS if P < P
eq:
Finally, note that since investors compete submitting demand schedules conditional on price (limit
orders), these strategies are optimal in a simultaneous-move game. For given demand of the other large
investor and of small investors (to be derived in Corollary 1), the controlling shareholder anticipates
that if he deviates and demands an amount of shares lower than HCS , the equilibrium price is lower and
the other large investor demands a stake large enough to acquire control.
B Proof of Corollary 1
Small investorsdemand schedules are derived by solving the problem of a large investor without control,
described in the proof of Proposition 1. The optimal portfolio allocation is obtained by comparing the
payo¤ that can be achieved investing only in the risk free asset (i.e., by imposing HPI = 
F
PI = 0), in
the risk free asset and the domestic stocks (i.e., by imposing FPI = 0), in the risk free asset and the
foreign stocks (i.e., by imposing HPI = 0), and the risk free asset and domestic and foreign stocks.
Since we assume that investors cannot borrow to invest in the risky assets, the constraint FP  +
HP + 2c W0 is binding for individuals with low levels of the initial wealth.
If 1 > 0 and it is optimal to invest in both the domestic and foreign risky asset, then both rst
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order conditions must be satised and therefore X B P 
2
X
H
PI
P =
X B P  2XFPI
P  : Together with
the binding no-borrowing constraint this implies:
HPI =
1
P 2 + P 2

P (W0   2c) + P 2
x  B
2X
  PP x  B

2X

FPI =
1
P 2 + P 2

P  (W0   2c) + P 2
x  B
2X
  PP x  B
2X

Similarly, if 1 > 0 and it is optimal to invest in only one risky asset, say the domestic risky asset,
the demand schedule is:
HPI =
W0   c
P
:
Since the optimal portfolio shares HPI and 
F
PI are weakly increasing in W0; for low levels of the
initial wealth, the payo¤ from investing in risky assets may be very low. Therefore, it is always possible
to nd a lower bound for the initial wealth W (B;B; P; P ) such that if W < W (B;B; P; P ) it is
optimal to choose HPI = 
F
PI = 0 to save the xed participation cost c.
Individuals with initial wealth larger than W (B;B; P; P ) nd it optimal to invest in the domestic
or foreign equity market depending on which one o¤ers higher security benets, and spend c (but not 2c).
If X B P 2XHCS  X B P  2XHCS; the investor demands HPI = min
n
Wo c
P ; 
H
optimal
o
and FPI = 0. Similarly, if X   B   P   2XHCS < X   B   P    2XHCS , the investor demands
HPI = 0 and 
F
PI = min
n
Wo c
P  ; 
F
optimal
o
: This is the case for individuals who due to the wealth
constraint cannot invest a large amount of wealth in the risky assets and therefore have initial wealth
lower than the upper bound W (B;B; P; P ):
Individuals with initial wealth larger than W (B;B; P; P ) invest in both risky assets and may
eventually reach the optimal level of diversication of their portfolios.
Finally, note that small investors being less wealthy cannot contest the control from large investors.
C Proof of the existence of the equilibrium
In our economy, individual demands have several discontinuities because of the xed participation costs
and the discontinuity in payo¤s due to the possibility of becoming controlling shareholders. Nevertheless,
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we can prove the existence of the equilibrium if the functions at the left-hand-side of equations (4) and
(5) are continuous, as this guarantees the existence of a xed point.
Note that the left-hand-side of (4) is the sum of the equilibrium demand of the controlling shareholder
(7), Hoptimal, 
F
optimal, and the demands derived in Corollary 1. Only the demands of small investors
with wealthW (B;B; P; P ) andW (B;B; P; P ) are discontinuous. However, since we assume that the
cumulative density function F is continuous, this implies that only the demands of a set of individuals
with zero measure is discontinuous.
Hence, a vanishingly small proportion of investors displays a discontinuity (cfr. Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green, 1995, p.122-123 and p. 629). Formally, the aggregate demands in (4) and (5) are equal
to the sum of products of continuous functions. Hence, the aggregate demands for assets which are
the average demand of a continuum of small investors plus the continuous demand functions of large
investors40are continuous. This ensures that an equilibrium exists.
It is straightforward to show that our aggregate excess demands dened as the aggregate demand
minus the initial endowmentgo to 1 if any of the prices go to zero and they are bounded below at
 1. Hence, a Walrasian equilibrium exists (cfr. Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, p. 585).
D Proof of Proposition 2
As proved in Proposition 1, for given prices, the demand of investors with control is weakly increasing
in B. The demand of domestic and foreign investors without control instead weakly decreases in B.
The aggregate demand for the domestic risky asset is a weighted sum of the demand of investors
with and without control. As B increases, the aggregate demand increases if there is a positive e¤ect on
the demand of the controlling shareholder, and this prevails over the negative e¤ect on the demand of
portfolio investors. Hence, a necessary condition for the aggregate demand for stocks to increase as B
goes up is B < 
2
X
2 , which guarantees that the controlling shareholders demand for stocks is increasing
in B. In this case, it is always possible to nd a wealth distribution for which the positive demand
e¤ect prevails.
To see this, consider the following example. There is an economy with n investors holding Hoptimal
and a controlling shareholder (with less than 50 per cent of the stocks). The aggregate demand for
40Note that for the purpose of nding the xed point (P eq), the demand of the large shareholder without control is
continuous.
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stocks is: Dagg =
(n+1)(X B P )+
p
22XB
2X
: The aggregate demand is increasing in B if @Dagg@B =  
n+1
2x
+
1
2
1
2x
p
22Xp
B
> 0: The latter inequality is satised if
p
B <
p
22X
2(n+1) . Ceteris paribus, this condition is
more likely to be satised for small n (i.e., for low number of portfolio investors).
Also note that for given participation decision, the demand of portfolio investors who hold less than
Hoptimal does not depend on B; as it can be written as
Wo c
P . Nevertheless, depending on the distribution
of wealth, decisions not to buy domestic stocks may decrease the aggregate demand.
In conclusion, if portfolio investors hold relatively little domestic equity, an increase in B may require
an increase in P to bring the aggregate excess demand to zero in the market for the domestic risky
asset.
E Proof of Corollary 2
The proof follows readily from the discussion in the text.
F Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 2, we know that the relation between domestic asset prices and quality of law is
non-monotonic. This implies that stock prices may either increase or decrease when investor protection
becomes weaker. Assume rst that P increases as investor protection becomes weaker. In this case, the
expected security return from investment, X  B   P , decreases unequivocally. Therefore, the wealth
of the marginal investor who is indi¤erent between buying domestic stocks or not increases.
Consider now the case in which P decreases as investor protection gets weaker. By contradiction,
assume that X  B P increases and therefore portfolio investor participation increases. This implies
that demand for the domestic risky asset by portfolio investors increases. Since when investor protection
gets weaker, the demand for stocks from the controlling increases with respect to portfolio investors, this
would imply that all investors increase their demand for domestic stocks. In equilibrium, the price for
domestic stocks would therefore increase. Since this is a contradiction, we can conclude that portfolio
investor participation in the domestic market decreases and X  B   P decreases as well.
From an analytical point of view the fact that security benets are decreasing in B is easily seen if
the aggregate demand is Dagg =
(n+1)(X B P )+
p
22XB
2X
(as in the example presented in the proof of
Proposition 2). In this case, the equilibrium condition for the domestic risky asset implies that equilib-
rium security returns are equal to
2X 
p
22XB
n+1 , which for given investor participation is decreasing in
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B. Also note that, as argued above, a decrease in investor participation can only follow from a decrease
in security returns.
The second part of the Proposition derives from the fact that for given wealth distribution, demand
from the controlling shareholder is lower in the strong investor protection country for any price level.
In equilibrium, either the risky asset price is lower in the strong investor protection country making
security benets clearly higher or the risky asset price is higher. If the risky asset price is higher,
then the demand for the risky asset from portfolio investors must be larger in the strong investor
protection country (because the demand from the controlling shareholder is lower). But this can be
true in equilibrium only if security returns are higher in the strong investor protection country.
G Proof of Corollary 3
The proof follows readily from Proposition 3 and the discussion in the text.
H Proof of Proposition 4
The non-contestability constraint and the optimization problems are derived like in Proposition 1. In
particular, condition (6) has to be slightly modied to account for the fact that control may be contested
by a large investor from another country with a lower level of wealth. If  is the di¤erence in wealth
between the two investors competing for control, the richest investor acquires control in equilibrium
with a stake:
HCS = min
8<:(X  B   P ) +
q
22X (B  )
2X
;
1
2
9=; :
Since the functional form of individual demands for stocks does not change, points 1, 2 and 3 of
Proposition 4 are proved like in the version of the model with segmented markets for control.
By contradiction, assume that demand for equity from the controlling shareholder is larger in Foreign
than at Home. Under our assumptions this may only be optimal if P  < P because the lower price
must compensate for lower private benets of control. If this were true also the demand for equity
from portfolio investors should be higher in Foreign as security benets would denitively be larger.
However, this would imply that the aggregate demand for the foreign risky asset is larger than the
aggregate demand for the domestic risky asset making P  < P a contradiction. Hence, in equilibrium,
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the aggregate demand from the controlling shareholder must be larger at Home for any price level.
Similarly, since B > B in equilibrium the demand from portfolio investors is larger in Foreign than at
Home and X  B   P < X  B   P :
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Table 1. Main Data 
Our main data source for the domestic investors’ participation rates in the domestic stock market is the 1999 Share 
Ownership Survey conducted by the World Federation of Exchanges, which provides data on the fraction of households who 
directly hold stocks in 1998 for Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sri Lanka, the UK and the US. The data for France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden are from Guiso et al. (2003), who use 
national household surveys for 1997 or 1998. The data for Belgium, Germany, Greece, India, Singapore, Taiwan and Turkey 
are from the June 2002 Factbook published by the Deutsches Aktieninstitut and refer to the year 2000. Finally, the data on 
Switzerland, Portugal and Ireland are from the following national private investment reports, respectively: a report of the 
Marktforschungsinstitut Demoscope, which surveyed a representative sample of 3242 individuals in 1998, the "Survey into 
the profile of the Portuguese private investor" from the Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobilliáros, and the report on 
"Private share ownership in Ireland" from Goodbody Stockbrokers. Data on Portugal and Ireland refer to 1999. The estimate 
for foreign equity holdings of domestic investors relative to their stock market wealth uses data from the 2002 IMF 
Coordinated Survey of Portfolio Investment. Anti-director rights is an index of shareholder protection from La Porta et al. 
(1998). Private enforcement is an index obtained by averaging indicators of disclosure requirements and liability standards 
that make easier for investors to recover damages when information is wrong or omitted and is from La Porta et al. (2006). 
Stock market capitalization is from the World Federation of Exchanges as of December 31, 2002. % Closely held market 
capitalization is calculated as the percentage of closely held stocks for all firms reported in Worldscope in 2002.  
 
Country Domestic 
investors’ 
participation 
rates in the 
domestic 
stock market 
Foreign equity 
holdings by 
domestic 
investors 
     Anti-director 
    rights  
Private  
enforcement 
  
Stock market 
capitalization in 
billion $ 
% Closely held 
market 
capitalization  
Argentina  0.507 4 0.36 16.549 60.16 
Australia 0.404 0.243 4 0.71 380.087 42.06 
Austria 0.056 0.708 2 0.18 33.578 62.99 
Belgium 0.05 0.666 0 0.43 115.224 53.91 
Brazil  0.054 3 0.29 126.762 67.28 
Canada 0.25 0.302 5 0.96 570.223 27.75 
Chile  0.214 3 0.46 49.828 66.64 
Denmark 0.28 0.457 2 0.68 76.750 46.95 
Egypt  0.034 2 0.36 26.330 51.67 
Finland 0.187 0.220 3 0.58 138.833 41.49 
France 0.15 0.387 3 0.49 825.070 62.37 
Germany 0.089 0.572 1 0.21 686.014 63.86 
Greece 0.102 0.057 2 0.39 66.040 60.43 
Hong Kong 0.138 0.319 5 0.79 463.055 55.84 
India 0.033  5 0.79 242.844 53.57 
Indonesia  0.005 2 0.58 55.739 66.79 
Ireland 0.17 0.791 4 0.61 59.938 33.78 
Israel  0.101 3 0.67 40.774 61.89 
Italy 0.07 0.507 1 0.44 477.075 49.57 
Japan 0.297 0.155 4 0.71 2095.516 45.18 
Korea  0.02 2 0.71 246.911 35.60 
Malaysia  0.026 3 0.79 122.892 47.83 
Netherlands 0.14 0.495 2 0.75 395.560 43.92 
New Zealand 0.31 0.458 4 0.55 21.715 49.45 
Norway 0.21 0.599 4 0.51 68.103 45.61 
Philippines  0.024 4 0.92 18.183 73.44 
Portugal 0.145 0.358 3 0.54 41.931 63.81 
Singapore 0.083 0.418 4 0.83 101.554 57.70 
Sri Lanka 0.023  3 0.60 1.680 48.00 
South Africa  0.379 4 0.75 116.544 51.97 
Spain  0.162 2 0.58 461.560 50.24 
Sweden 0.22 0.452 3 0.46 179.117 37.44 
Switzerland 0.176 0.428 2 0.55 547.020 46.62 
Taiwan 0.125  3 0.79 261.311 27.11 
Thailand  0.004 3 0.71 45.406 58.34 
Turkey 0.012 0.003 2 0.36 34.217 62.38 
UK 0.3 0.311 5 0.75 1800.658 33.93 
US 0.26 0.163 5 1.00 11055.578 39.53 
Venezuela  0.004 1 0.19 3.980 37.94 
Table 2. Domestic Investors’ Participation in the Domestic Stock Market 
The dependent variable is the domestic investors’ participation rate in the domestic stock market.  Gini income is the Gini coefficient of income from Deininger and Squire (1996). 
Schooling is the average years of schooling of the total population over 25 in 1990 from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001). Anti-director rights is an index of shareholder protection 
from La Porta et al. (1998). Market cap. to GDP is the ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Log GDP per capita is the logarithm of GDP per capita. GDP and GDP per capita are from 
the IMF. Rev. anti-director is the revised index of shareholder protection presented in Djankov et al. (2008). Anti-selfdealing is the index capturing laws aiming to limit selfdealing by 
company insiders as computed by Djankov et al. (2008). Private enforcement is an index obtained by averaging indicators of disclosure requirements and liability standards that make 
it easier for investors to recover damages when information is wrong or omitted and is from La Porta et al. (2006). Public enforcement is an index of public enforcement as presented 
in La Porta et al (2006). Law and order is an indicator of law and order tradition, constructed by the International Country Risk Guide. Spamann’s shareholder rights is an index of 
shareholder rights calculated by Spamann (2006) following the methodology suggested by la Porta et al (1998), but considering only mandated laws. In columns (1) to (4) of Panel A 
and Panel B estimates are obtained by ordinary least squares. In column (7) of Panel A, estimates are obtained using instrumental variables. The instruments are three dummy variables 
capturing whether the country has French, English or German legal origin as defined in La Porta et al. (1998). In columns (5) and (6) of Panel A, estimates are obtained using a robust 
regressions to detect outliers as suggested by Huber (1964). Robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote that a coefficient is significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  The constant is included in all regressions but parameter estimates are omitted. 
Panel A. Basic specifications 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Anti-director rights  0.035*** 0.051*** 0.029*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.029* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
Gini income  0.003 0.003 0.006*  0.003 0.006** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Market cap. to GDP  -0.113*  -0.112**  -0.087* -0.088 
  (0.054)  (0.046)  (0.047) (0.06) 
Log GDP per capita  0.123*** 0.039 0.062**  0.052* 0.049* 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.026)  (0.028) (0.027) 
Schooling   0.025** 0.025**  0.022** 0.028*** 
   (0.011) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.008) 
        
Observations 26 21 21 21 26 21 21 
R-squared 0.23 0.69 0.73 0.81 0.26 0.76 0.79 
        
F-test of excluded instruments  
(p-value) 
      7.97 
(0.07) 
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions 
(p-value) 
      
0.23 
(0.88) 
Panel B.  Alternative indexes of investor protection 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rev. anti-director  0.033*      
 (0.017)      
Private enforcement   0.199* 0.235*    
  (0.109) (0.131)    
Public enforcement    -0.036    
   (0.077)    
Anti-selfdealing     0.166*   
    (0.086)   
Law and order     0.042**  
     (0.015)  
Spamann’s shareholder rights       0.040*** 
      (0.012) 
Gini income 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.009* 0.011* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Market cap. to GDP -0.094 -0.103 -0.107 -0.017 -0.065 -0.067 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.063) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) 
Log GDP per capita 0.054 0.014 0.014 0.025 0.003 0.001 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) 
Schooling 0.027** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.020* 0.030*** 0.040*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
       
Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 
R-squared 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.72 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics related to institutional investors’ holdings of foreign equity and the explanatory 
variables that are used in the regressions in Table 4. Portfolio share is the proportion of equity invested  in the target country 
relative to the total equity holdings of institutional investors from the origin country as of December 31, 2002. Home bias – 
world market capitalization is 1 minus the ratio of the weights of the target country in the portfolio of institutional investors 
from the origin country relative to the target’s weight in the world market capitalization. Home bias – free-float world market 
capitalization is 1 minus the ratio of the weights of the target country in the portfolio of institutional investors from the origin 
country relative to the target’s weight in the free-float world market capitalization. The free-float of the country has been 
calculated as the fraction of market capitalization of the target country that is not closely held, as suggested by Dahlquist et al. 
(2003). Free float weight-target (origin) is calculated as the ratio of the free-float of the target (origin) country to the free-float 
world market capitalization as of December 31, 2002. Market cap. weight-target (origin) is the stock market capitalization of 
the target (origin) country divided by the world stock market capitalization as of December 31, 2002. Private enforcement-
target (origin) is an index obtained by averaging  indicators of disclosure requirements and liability standards that make easier 
for investors to recover damages when information is wrong or omitted in the target  (origin) country and is from La Porta et 
al. (2006). Public enforcement-target (origin) is an index of public enforcement in the target (origin) country and is from La 
Porta et al (2006). Anti-director rights-target (origin) is an index of shareholder protection in the target (origin) country and is 
from La Porta et al. (1998). Rev. anti-director-target (origin) is the revised index of shareholder rights in the target (origin) 
country and is from Djankov et al. (2008). Law and order-target (origin) is an indicator of law and order tradition in the target 
(origin) country, constructed by the International Country Risk Guide. Market cap. to GDP-origin is the stock market 
capitalization divided by the GDP in the origin country. Log distance is the natural logarithm of the distance between the 
domicile of the main stock exchange in the origin country and the domicile of the main stock exchange in the target country 
and is from Gande and Parsley (2005). Foreign capital restr.-target are restrictions to access foreign capital in the target 
country from the World Economic Forum, 2003. Access to foreign cap.-origin measures the lack of restrictions to access 
foreign capital markets in the origin country and is from World Economic Forum, 2003.  Previous year return-target (origin) is 
the stock market return during the previous year in US Dollar in the target (origin) country and is from Datastream. Return 
correlation is the correlation of monthly returns from 1995 to 2001 between target country j and origin country i. GDP 
growth-target (origin) is the previous year per capita GDP growth in the target (origin) country in US Dollar. Log GDP per 
capita-target (origin) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in US Dollar in 2002. GDP per capita is from the CIA World 
Factbook. Gini income-origin is the Gini coefficient of income in the origin country from Deininger and Squire (1996). Same 
legal origin is a dummy that takes value equal to 1 if origin and target country have same legal origin as defined in La Porta et 
al. (1998). Cultural proximity is a dummy variable that takes value equal to 1 if target and origin country share the language 
or if the target (origin) has colonized the origin (target) country and is from Sarkissian and Schill (2003). Trade openness-
target (origin) is the sum of the country's imports and exports as a percentage of GDP in the target (origin) country in 2001 
and is from the World Bank. Corporate tax rate-target (origin) is corporate tax rate in the target (origin) country and is from 
Cooper and Lybrand International Tax Summaries. In the regressions, we exploit investments from 31 origin countries to 34 
target countries for a maximum of 1023 observations. The weight of the target country in the portfolio of institutional 
investors from a given country is equal to zero in 11 cases. Sample composition varies due to missing observations for the 
independent variables.   
 
Variable Median Standard 
deviation 
1st quartile 4th quartile 
Portfolio share 0.0001 0.06 0.00001 0.0003 
Home bias – world market capitalization 0.99 2.92 0.95 1.00 
Home bias – free-float world market capitalization 0.55 81.81 -0.66 0.85 
Market cap. weight - target 0.01 0.08 0.001 0.02 
Market cap. weight - origin 0.01 0.10 0.002 0.02 
Free float weight - target 0.01 0.04 0.004 0.03 
Free float weight - origin 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Private enforcement - target 0.58 0.23 0.42 0.75 
Private enforcement - origin 0.54 0.24 0.42 0.75 
Public enforcement - target 0.50 0.26 0.29 0.69 
Public enforcement - origin 0.46 0.28 0.25 0.69 
Anti-director rights-target 3 1.36 2 4 
Anti-director rights-origin 3 1.54 2 4 
Rev. anti-director - target 3.5 1.09 3 4 
Rev. anti-director - origin 3.5 1.04 3 4 
Law and order-target 5 1.42 4 6 
Law and order-origin 5 1.16 4.5 6 
Market cap. to GDP-origin 0.79 0.59 0.48 1.10 
Log distance 8.82 1.13 7.43 9.18 
Foreign capital restr.- target 6.79 3.36 1.54 8.46 
Access to foreign cap.- origin 9.12 0.83 8.91 9.70 
Previous year return - target -0.16 0.15 -0.21 -0.04 
Previous year return - origin -0.16 0.12 -0.22 -0.06 
Return correlation 0.38 0.22 0.22 0.52 
GDP growth - target 1.24 2.40 0.32 2.73 
GDP growth - origin 1.42 1.88 0.73 2.73 
Log GDP per capita - target 9.91 9.07 9.08 10.14 
Log GDP per capita - origin 10.12 0.72 10.03 10.21 
Gini income - origin 33.28 8.16 29.78 37.07 
Same legal origin 1 0.42 1 1 
Cultural proximity 0 0.29 0 0 
Trade openness - target 56.20 61.45 40.81 72.36 
Trade openness - origin 63.78 75.36 43.54 74.48 
Corporate tax - target 0.39 0.08 0.35 0.43 
Corporate tax - origin 0.40 0.08 0.34 0.43 
Table 4. Institutional Investors’ Foreign Equity Holdings 
In column (1) of Panel A, the home bias is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of the weights of the target country in the 
portfolio of institutional investors from the origin country relative to the target’s weight in the world market 
capitalization. In all remaining specifications, the home bias is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of the weights of the target 
country in the portfolio of institutional investors from the origin country relative to the target’s weight in the free-float 
world market capitalization. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 3. In column (7) of Panel B, only countries of 
origin that belong to the OECD are included. All estimates in Panels A and B are obtained by ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Estimates in Panel C are obtained by instrumental variables. The instrumented variables are investor protection in 
target and origin countries. In columns (1) to (3), the instruments are six dummy variables capturing whether the origin 
(target) country has French, English or German legal origin as defined in La Porta et al. (1998).  In columns (4) to (6), the 
instruments are settlers' mortality rates in European colonies as defined in Acemoglu et al. (2001). Standard errors 
between parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country of origin level.  ***, **, * denote 
that a coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Basic specifications with different measures of investor protection 
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Home bias –
world market 
capitalization 
Home bias – free-float world market capitalization 
Private enforcement - target -0.005** -0.050 -0.101 -0.684    
 (0.002) (0.072) (0.075) (2.228)    
Private enforcement - origin 0.008*** 0.234*** 0.344*** 10.436*    
 (0.002) (0.072) (0.092) (6.120)    
Public enforcement - target    -0.665    
    (0.895)    
Public enforcement - origin    -7.761*    
    (3.961)    
Law and order - target     0.628   
     (0.452)   
Law and order - origin     0.772*   
     (0.410)   
Anti-director rights - target      -0.021  
      (0.067)  
Anti-director rights - origin      0.025*  
      (0.012)  
Rev. anti-director - target       -0.049*** 
       (0.014) 
Rev. anti-director - origin       0.325*** 
       (0.092) 
Market cap. weight - target -0.011**       
 (0.006)       
Market cap. weight - origin -0.001       
 (0.005)       
Free float weight - target  -0.759* -0.282 10.065 10.235 -0.391 -0.192 
  (0.439) (0.479) (8.304) (6.434) (0.461) (0.434) 
Free float weight - origin  0.640 0.652 3.641 26.918*** 1.136*** 0.539 
  (0.401) (0.439) (16.880) (8.286) (0.431) (0.437) 
Log distance 0.009*** 0.304*** 0.294*** 0.287 0.557 0.320*** 0.318*** 
 (0.000) (0.015) (0.016) (0.798) (0.717) (0.017) (0.016) 
Market cap. to GDP - origin   -0.095*** -0.288 0.308 -0.090*** -0.087*** 
   (0.032) (0.994) (0.669) (0.030) (0.032) 
Foreign capital restr. - target     -0.012** 0.008 -0.090 -0.001 -0.016*** 
   (0.005) (0.274) (0.167) (0.006) (0.005) 
Access to foreign cap.-origin   -0.053*** 0.414 -0.193 0.014 -0.054*** 
   (0.020) (1.094) (0.404) (0.012) (0.020) 
        
Observations 930 930 930 930 1023 930 930 
R-squared 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.40 
 
Panel B. Different sets of controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Private enforcement – target -0.059 -0.081 -0.043 -0.110 -0.170** -0.099 -0.128 
 (0.067) (0.069) (0.076) (0.069) (0.080) (0.078) (0.086) 
Private enforcement – origin 0.374*** 0.372*** 0.403*** 0.198** 0.349*** 0.382*** 0.568*** 
 (0.083) (0.085) (0.093) (0.089) (0.094) (0.093) (0.125) 
Free float weight-target -0.254 -0.038 -0.330 -0.407 0.102 -0.324 -0.238 
 (0.432) (0.467) (0.479) (0.444) (0.510) (0.492) (0.556) 
Free float weight-origin 0.174 1.450*** 0.587 0.636 0.534 0.346 -0.159 
 (0.388) (0.428) (0.440) (0.391) (0.476) (0.457) (0.509) 
Log distance 0.240*** 0.263*** 0.297*** 0.276*** 0.289*** 0.309*** 0.299*** 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) 
Market cap. to GDP - origin -0.081*** -0.070** -0.088*** -0.047 -0.083** -0.059* -0.267*** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.054) 
Foreign capital restr. - target   -0.006 -0.001 -0.012** -0.011** -0.015*** -0.010* -0.011* 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Access to foreign cap.- origin -0.026 0.027 -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.050** -0.032 0.107 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.091) 
Previous year return - target -0.426***       
 (0.114)       
Previous year return - origin -0.679***       
 (0.123)       
Return correlation -0.580***       
 (0.094)       
Gdp growth - target  -0.018***      
  (0.006)      
Gdp growth - origin  0.017**      
  (0.008)      
Log GDP per capita - target  -0.102***      
  (0.027)      
Log GDP per capita - origin  -0.302***      
  (0.055)      
Same legal origin   0.059     
   (0.078)     
Cultural proximity   -0.197***     
   (0.049)     
Gini income - origin    -0.004**    
    (0.002)    
Trade openness - target     0.000*   
     (0.000)   
Trade openness - origin     -0.000   
     (0.000)   
Corporate tax - target      0.036  
      (0.212)  
Corporate tax - origin      0.776***  
      (0.242)  
        
Observations 930 930 930 840 930 930 720 
R-squared 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.40 
 
Panel C. Instrumental variable estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Legal origin Settlers' Mortality 
Private enforcement – target -2.780   48.792   
 (3.303)   (39.403)   
Private enforcement – origin 2.157***   53.529***   
 (0.586)   (13.167)   
Rev. anti-director - target  0.489   8.167  
  (0.880)   (5.983)  
Rev. anti-director - origin  2.093***   36.980***  
  (0.573)   (13.036)  
Law and order – target   0.784   5.350 
   (0.611)   (3.598) 
Law and order - origin   2.151**   13.756*** 
   (0.990)   (4.558) 
Free float weight - target 16.461 7.718 9.282 -53.496 170.865** 80.847 
 (12.451) (8.396) (13.450) (118.093) (69.827) (74.481) 
Free float weight - origin 25.014*** 25.749*** 25.376** -28.306 376.783*** 50.261 
 (6.843) (7.058) (11.930) (53.950) (111.186) (59.224) 
Log distance 0.618 0.446 0.595 5.671** 5.903** 5.503* 
 (0.532) (0.592) (0.497) (2.263) (2.963) (3.069) 
Market cap. to GDP - origin 0.420 0.450 0.426 -1.414 -27.028** 3.478 
 (0.656) (0.677) (0.830) (3.369) (12.006) (4.019) 
Foreign capital restr. - target   0.076 0.129 -0.111 -1.260 0.339 -1.096 
 (0.244) (0.298) (0.232) (1.134) (0.956) (1.107) 
Access to foreign cap.- origin -0.395 -0.388 -0.403 -1.625 12.959** -7.045** 
 (0.427) (0.419) (0.412) (2.216) (5.674) (3.225) 
       
       
Observations 930 930 1023 120 120 120 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.33 0.10 0.11 
       
       
F-test of excluded instruments 33.18 33.40 87.59 6.03 15.77 18.00 
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions 
(p-value) 
3.92 
(0.42) 
12.87 
(0.01) 
2.89 
(0.58) 
   
 
